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Introduction
In most industrialized countries Public Employment Agencies (hereafter, PEA) provide job-brokering services -arrange job seekers to obtain jobs and employers to fill vacancies. The market places provided by PEAs comprise all unemployed, who register to receive benefits, and are open to all job seekers and vacancies at zero cost. Still, the costless services provided by the PEAs do not attract all of them. This is even more puzzling than it sounds given the fact that the advances in technology make it possible for PEAs to centralize job applications and to mitigate coordination frictions present in decentralized search markets.
The existing empirical literature shows that unemployment benefit recipients, low skilled workers, long-term unemployed and workers with few job opportunities are more likely to use a PEA.
1 While these findings are indicative of a negativ self-selection of job-seekers into the PEA, they are less informative of how labor markets with the PEA work, why PEAs are associated with a negative selection of workers, and why firms use different search channels.
In order to gain the entire picture of how a labor market in the presence of a PEA works, we develop a simple theory and empirically test its predictions. In particular, we aim at understanding why the costless and coordinated job-brokering service offered by the PEA cannot attract all the available vacancies in the first place. 2 Our theoretical model extends the pioneering work on the role of PEAs by Pissarides (1979) . Like him we assume that all unemployed are registered at the PEA, that searching in the decentralized market is costly for workers, and that firms can choose between two alternative methods of finding a worker: the search market and the PEA. There are two major differences between his and our model. First, workers are homogeneous in Pissarides (1979) , while the key ingredient of our model is that workers differ in productivity, and that firms have some technologies to screen applicants, imperfectly though, at the recruitment stage. Second, Pissarides (1979) assumes an exogenous and identical wage in both markets. In contrast, by adopting a directed search approach, we show that firms in the decentralized market choose to post higher wages than firms registered with the PEA in order to attract workers despite the cost associated with searching in the private market. Since the value of searching in the private market is higher for high productivity workers, the endogenous wage differential allows firms in the private market to attract a better pool of applicants. In an extension, Pissarides (1979) considers the limiting case where search frictions are eliminated in the PEA. He finds that in this case the private market collapses and all workers search via the PEA. This is in contrast to our model. We show that the positive selection of workers in the search market ensures the existence of the decentralized search market even if the PEA manages to match the short side of the market.
We use the German Job Vacancy Survey, a representative establishment data-set collected by the 1 See Holzer (1988) and Blau and Robins (1990) for the US, Osberg (1993) for Canada and Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) for the UK. Federal Employment Agency in Germany, which contains numerous questions regarding the recruitment process, to investigate the explanation suggested by our theory. We find that the fraction of suitable applicants at vacancies registered with the PEA is about 10 percent lower than at vacancies that only use decentralized search channels. This evidence is complementary to the evidence provided in the existing literature, which shows that less suited workers are more likely to use PEAs (see footnote 1).
Our complement is important in order to understand the role of PEAs in the labor market, since the evidence from the workers' side alone does not necessarily imply that the mechanism proposed by our theory is at work in reality. It could for example be that, in contrast to our theory, PEAs can detect low type workers, sort them out, and thereby help registered firms to overcome information asymmetries.
Instead, our empirical result that registered firms are less likely to get better applicants clarifies that PEAs are not able to screen applicants as good as the search market.
Given that registered firms receive a less suited pool of applicants, the question arises why firms register at all at PEAs. Our theory suggests that under the job-brokering service provided by PEAs, the job application process is coordinated so that firms do not need to compete through wage offers to attract workers' applications. This allocation mechanism allows registered firms to fill their vacancies at lower wage costs, since there is always a chance that even high productivity workers do not receive any offers from the private market. The empirical evidence for the hypothesis that workers that found their job through the PEA receive lower wage offers than workers that found their job through other search channels is mixed. Holzer (1988) reports for the US and Addison and Protugal (2002) for Portugal that workers, who searched through the PEA, received lower wage offers (after controlling for worker characteristics). Osberg (1993) finds for Canada and Weber and Mahringer (2002) for Austria that the wage difference disappears after controlling for worker characteristics. Our evidence shows that firms registered at the PEA are more likely to report difficulties in the recruitment process, because their applicants demanded higher wages. This supports not only the hypothesis that firms, which register their vacancy with the PEA, offer lower wages than firms, which did not register their vacancy. It also implies that one and the same worker can receive multiple wage offers, which differ systematically depending on whether the vacancy is registered with the PEA or not. This is in line with our theory, which suggests that the job-brokering activity and its coordinated job application are responsible for lower wages offers at PEAs.
Our paper is related to the literature of intermediation. Watanabe (2010 Watanabe ( , 2013 provide a directed search model of middlemen (e.g., retailers, wholesalers, trading entrepreneurs, dealers or brokers of services and durable goods and assets).
3 He demonstrates that backed by the capability of dealing with many agents at a time, middlemen find it optimal to provide customers with proximity or a lower likelihood of experiencing stockout, charging a higher price. That the PEA in the present framework provides a coordinated transaction is similar to his middlemen's capability of pursuing large-scaled dealings. However, in contrast to the literature, the PEA does not act as a private agent, who charges a premium for their service, which raises the question why not all agents use the middlemen. In a recent progress, Gautier, Hu and Watanabe (2015) offer a hybrid model of middlemen and marketmakers (i.e., platform), and study the choice of the two alternative intermediation modes. Unlike in the present model, agents are homogeneous and the issue of differential composition of heterogeneous agents is not addressed.
Our framework is also related to the directed search literature with private information, which assumes that firms observe a signal before hiring a worker. Menzio (2007) considers wage-bargaining in a framework where firms use cheap talk to signal private information about the quality of a vacancy.
Delacroix and Shi (2013) consider a directed search model with signaling, where sellers can distort their posted prices upward in order to signal high quality. In our case, firms receive a signal after screening workers, which allows them to reject workers with a low signal. We also assume that firms cannot condition their wages on the signal they receive (or demand an application fee). We therefore have a directed search model with incomplete contracts like Michelacci and Suarez (2006) , who analyze under which conditions firms prefer wage posting over wage bargaining. The incomplete contracting assumption distinguishes our model also from the work by Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010), who consider an environment where firms can post complete contracts and who establish that firms can always use these contracts to separate types.
4
The novelty of our approach is that our workers hold not only private information about their type but they are also able to search in two markets simultaneously.
In the directed search literature, where workers simultaneously apply for multiple jobs, Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) show that firms engage in Bertrand competition, if their applicant receives two or more offers. Unlike in their setup, we assume wage commitment and show that a low wage can survive in equilibrium due to the coordinated allocation mechanism used by the PEA. Galenianos and Kircher (2009) consider the case of commitment with homogeneous workers and show the existence of an equilibrium wage dispersion. In our model, workers can apply only to one firm in the decentralized market, just like in the standard directed search models, but there are some workers who use both the search market and the PEA, and hence receive multiple offers, one from the search market and the other from the PEA. In this setup we show that, while the search market has a unique wage, a wage differential exists between the search market and the PEA. Our modeling choice reflects the institutional difference between the two market places in reality.
There are very few other papers that consider the role of PEAs. Finally, Casella and Hanaki (2008) and Galenianos (2013) study firms' use of referrals by their own employees in addition to formal hiring channels. 5 Referred workers may be more suited for the job, because referred workers carry a more accurate productivity signal than workers contacted through a formal search channel. The search channels in our model do not differ in their signaling ability. They differ in the allocation mechanism used. In the search market firms can increase the probability to meet a worker by offering a higher wage, while firms' meeting probability at the PEA is independent of the wages they offer. The novelty of our paper is to show that the higher degree of wage competition among firms in the search market compared to the PEA leads to a positive selection of applicants.
The sequel of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model of the labor market in the presence of the PEA. In Section 3, we use data from the German Job Vacancy Survey to test the predictions of our theory. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical part
The model
We consider an economy with a unit mass of unemployed workers and a mass v ∈ (0, ∞) of firms. Each firm has one job vacancy that needs to be filled, and each worker wishes to find a job. There are two types of workers. A fraction m of them are productive workers, who can produce an output normalized to 1, and the rest are unproductive workers, who produce 0. The worker's type is private knowledge.
Firms possess screening technologies to hire workers. But their technologies are not perfect. We assume that screening can fail with probability δ ∈ (0, 1). So firms can detect an unproductive worker only with probability 1 − δ. To simplify the model we assume that interviewing costs are such that firms interview only one worker.
There are two channels through which matching between firms and unemployed workers can occur.
One is a Public Employment Agency (hereafter, PEA), where all unemployed workers are registered in order to collect unemployment benefit (normalized to zero). We model the job-brokering service provided by the PEA as follows. All job applications by registered workers are coordinated so that workers and firms are brought together on a one by one basis. Denote by a ∈ (0, 1] the maximum number of matching pairs the PEA can propose. a is a technological parameter and represents the efficiency of the PEA. The other channel is a search market, which may be referred to as a decentralized or private market. Here, unlike in the PEA, search is costly for workers and job applications are not coordinated. Workers have to incur an individual specific search cost represented by c drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. The parameter c is uncorrelated with the worker's type. The firms' cost required to post a vacancy is normalized to zero for both markets. How workers search without coordination will be specified below.
The economy lasts only one period and has the following stages. In the first stage, firms decide whether to post their vacancy in the search market or the PEA. Once firms are registered, the PEA selects randomly min{vρ, a} workers and suggests each of them to match with one of the registered firms. In the second stage, all firms post simultaneously a wage at which they are willing to hire a worker. The wage posted in the search market is denoted by w, and the wage posted in the PEA by w a . Having observed those wages, workers decide whether or not to enter the search market in the third stage. Once in the search market, workers must choose to which firm to send an application.
Assuming that each worker can send only one application and that workers cannot coordinate their actions over which firm to apply, we investigate a symmetric equilibrium where all workers use the identical application strategy for any configuration of the announced wages. This is the standard notion of directed search equilibria, see e.g., Peters (1991 Peters ( , 2001 ), Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer 
Equilibrium definition
In what follows, we construct a search market equilibrium which has the following characteristics. A fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1) of firms registered with the PEA post a wage w a = 0 and a fraction 1 − ρ of firms in the search market post a wage w ∈ (0, 1). All workers are registered in the PEA and accept the wage The expected queue length x satisfies,
where the numerator equals the total number of workers in the search market, mc m productive and (1− m)c u unproductive workers, while the denominator equals the total number of vacancies in the search market. Each productive worker, who searches in the private market, expects to be hired with probability η(x) = (1 − e −x ) /x in the search market, whereas each unproductive worker, who searches in the private market, expects to be hired with probability δη(x). The matching probability in the PEA equals min{vρ, a} for productive and δ min{vρ, a} for unproductive workers. Each individual firm expects to employ a productive worker (and can produce output 1) with probability
in the search market and with probability min{1, a/ (vρ)}m(1 − c m η(x)) in the PEA. The respectively probabilities to hire an unproductive worker are given by xη(
In the following we show that workers and firms have no incentive to deviate from the proposed search market equilibrium.
An equilibrium without active search market, i.e., ρ = 1, will be characterized when we describe the first-stage entry decision.
Existence and characterization
Workers' search decision: Assuming for the moment the existence of an equilibrium, we first describe workers' search decision. In any equilibrium where U m (U u ) is the expected value of search for a productive (an unproductive) worker, the participation decision is described by a reservation value for the search cost, i.e., Given the participation decision, we now describe workers' application decision in the search market.
For that purpose, consider a situation in which a firm in the search market deviates to a wage w > 0,
given that all other firms post w with associated queue length x. Note that this deviation is a measure zero event for the entire market. Let x be the expected queue of workers at this firm. Then, we must have,
where η(x ) = ∞ i=0
/x is the probability that a productive worker is employed if he applies to this firm. To derive this probability note that if there are i = 0, 1, 2, ... other applications to this firm, which happens with probability
/ (i!), then a given worker's application is selected with probability 1/ (i + 1). Similarly, for unproductive workers, it is,
where, the employment probability for an unmotivated worker is given by δη(x ), since the firm's screening succeeds and detects an unproductive worker only with probability 1 − δ. Observe that
as a strictly increasing function of the wage w given the market value U m .
Firms' wage offers: Given the search behaviors of workers described above, the next step is to characterize the equilibrium wages. Given w a = 0 in the PEA, we first derive an equilibrium wage in the search market. In any equilibrium where
is the value of a(n) (un)productive worker, the optimal wage of a firm, denoted by w(U m ), satisfies,
Here, the firm with a wage w and a queue x expects to receive at least one application with prob- In the latter case, if the firm detects successfully the worker's type, which is possible with probability 1 − δ, he does not hire this worker, yielding zero payoff. If the screening fails, which occurs with probability δ, then the firm employs this worker, who produces nothing, and the firm's payoff is −w .
Substituting out w using equation (2), the objective function of a firm, denoted by Π s (x ), can be written as,
where x = x(w |U m ) satisfies equation (2) . The first-order condition is,
The second order condition can be easily verified. Rearranging this condition using equation (2) one can obtain,
In a directed search equilibrium, workers must be indifferent between any of the individual firms. This leads to,
Hence, we have shown that given that w a = 0, the equilibrium wage in the search market w > 0 is given by equation (3).
Given w > 0 in the search market, we show next that the equilibrium wage in the PEA is given by the reservation wage w a = 0. Given that a proportion ρ ∈ [0, 1) of firms are in the PEA, the wage w a = 0 in the PEA yields an equilibrium profit,
where, given the probability of being allocated a worker min{a/ (vρ) , 1}, m(1 − c m η(x)) represents the number of productive workers, who do not receive a job offer in search market and are wiling to accept
The PEA matches registered workers and firms using its job-brokering mechanism. This allocation is independent of the wages offered by registered firms. The fact that registered firms cannot increase the PEA-internal matching probability min{a/ (vρ) , 1} by offering a higher wage implies that registered firms will never compete among themselves. They will only compete with firms in the decentralized market. This is the reason why a wage offer w a ∈ (0, w) cannot be profitable since such a deviation implies a mere increase in the wage cost without improving the probability of hiring a productive worker. If a deviating firm posts w a ≥ w, then it can hire an assigned productive worker, irrespective of whether the worker gets another offer in search market. Hence, the best deviation w a = w yields the profit,
We show in the Appendix that deviating and paying the private market wage w a = w is not profitable, i.e., that Π a (x) > Π a for any x ∈ (0, ∞). The reason, why the increase in the hiring probability associated with offering the private market wage w a = w is not able to compensate the for the higher wage cost, is that the average productivity of applicants at the PEA is lower than the average productivity of applicants in the decentralized market. It follows that registered firms offer only the reservation wage w a = 0, because the absence of PEA-internal wage competition due to the job-brokering mechanism at the PEA does not force them to offer higher wages. Thus, w a = 0 is the unique equilibrium wage in the PEA.
Firms' market choice: In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter the PEA or the search market for hiring a worker. Firms will choose the market that offers the highest expected profit. Thereby the equilibrium condition is given by,
where the equilibrium queue length in the search market x = x(ρ) is given in equation (1) for ρ ∈ [0, 1).
Given this equilibrium queue length, the equilibrium wages w > 0, in equation (3), and w a = 0, and the equilibrium search values of workers U m ≥ 0, in equation (4), and U u = δU m , the equilibrium profit in the PEA, Π a (x), is given by equation (5) and the equilibrium profit in the search market by, Before we state our Theorem let us first define,
where x * is a unique solution to Π a (x * ) = Π s (x * ). We now summarize the main result of our analysis on labor market equilibria with the PEA. Our theory estabishes that firms find it optimal to post higher wages in a decentralized search market in order to obtain a better selection of workers. Thus, firms induce workers to search in a costly decentralized market in order to reduce the information friction that is associated with a coordinated market like the PEA. The tradeoff between the search market and the PEA can be seen by looking at the benefits and costs of both markets. The benefit of using the search market is that it attracts a better selection of workers, i.e., the share of productive workers among all applicants is higher in the decentralized search market than in the PEA, i.e., for ρ ∈ [0, 1),
The benefit of having a better pool of applicants has to be weighted against the higher wage cost w > w a = 0, which firms have to pay to workers in order to induce them to engage in costly search in the decentralized market. The wage cost in the decentralized market is lower, when the number of firms v is lower so that the search market is less tight and less competitive. Hence, Theorem 1 shows that the search market is used exclusively, ρ = 0, when the number of vacancies v is low, and the search market coexists with the PEA, ρ ∈ (0, 1), when the number of vacancies v is high.
3 Empirical Analysis
German Job Vacancy Survey
We use the German Job Vacancy Survey, a dataset collected by the Federal Employment Agency in The survey includes establishment level data on firm size, number of vacancies, hires and quits in the last 12 months, and information on the industry and region of the firm. The economic conditions of a firm can be proxyed by binary indicator variables for "low sales", "financial constraints", and "not enough suitable employees". It also contains a number of questions concerning the last case of a successfully filled vacancy and if applicable the last case where a recruitment has been abandoned. 6 In both cases firms are asked to provide information on the qualification and experience level required for the job, on whether the vacancies were registered with the PEA and on whether the firm experienced difficulties in the recruitment process due to "high wage demands" of applicants or because they did not receive "enough suitable applicants". Unfortunately, no data on posted or paid wages is available.
In addition, a few interesting questions were not asked in the case where the firm decided to abandon the hiring process. The information on the number of applicants and the number of suitable applicants is only available for those vacancies, which were successful in hiring a worker. The same is true for job 
Testable predictions
Our main prediction is that firms, which register their vacancy with the PEA, receive on average a less productive pool of applicants. In our dataset firms report the number of applicants and the number of suitable applicants of their last successful hire. In our theoretical model firms identify with probability 
This inequality also holds if firms use the PEA alongside other search channels, as it is generally the case in the data. We will test this hypothesis in two ways. First, we will investigate the effect of having registered the vacancy with the PEA on the fraction of suitable applicants, an information which is only available for firms that successfully hired a worker. In a second regression we will use all vacancies and investigate the effect of having registered the vacancy with the PEA on the binary variable, which indicates that the firm experienced difficulties in the recruitment process because it did not receive "enough suitable applicants".
Our theory also predicts that firms in the decentralized market offer higher wages compared to firms registered in the PEA. For the empirical test we assume that vacancies that use other search channels alongside the PEA post lower wages in all search channels compared to vacancies that only use search channels associated with the decentralized market. Since we neither observe the posted nor the paid wage, we cannot directly test this hypothesis. We will therefore use the binary variable, which indicates that the firm experienced difficulties in the recruitment process due to "high wage demands" of its applicants. This information is available for successful as well as unsuccessful vacancies. According to our theory we expect that firms that register their vacancy with the PEA report more often, that they experience difficulties due to "high wage demands".
Identification
We do not have a natural experiment that would give us truly exogenous variation in the sign-up of vacancies to PEAs. Our dataset, however, provides more information than most other dataests to control not only for firm-but also for vacancy-level characteristics, which are thought to influence firms decisions to register a vacancy with the PEA. Most importantly, we have information on the skill and occupation level required for the vacant job and can control for job characteristics like permanent/temporary, full-/part-time, and weekend-work. We can also control for firm size as well as the economic condition of the firm as captured by the binary indicator variables "low sales", "financial constraints", and "not enough suitable employees".
It could still be the case that there are unobservable characteristics, which influence a firms' decision to register it's vacancy and which are correlated with the share of suitable applicants or the firms' frequency to experience difficulties due to "high wage demands". If the unobserved characteristic varies on the industrial or regional level, then this is controlled for by including industry-and region-fixedeffects. One could for example be worried that PEAs in regions with a higher share of less productive unemployed workers have invested more and hence are more efficient in getting vacancies registered.
This would, however, be captured by region-fixed-effects. And even if regional characteristics would change over time, e.g. do to the Hartz-reforms or the Great Recession, then this is controlled for by including year-fixed-effects and interaction variables of year-and region-fixed-effects.
We also want to rule out that vacancies, which were unsuccessful in receiving enough suitable applicants or were unsuccessful because of their low wage offer, decide to post their vacancy with the PEA in order to increase their chances to attract suitable candidates at the posted wages. To test this reverse causality hypothesis we use information on the earliest intended starting date for the employment relationship and the date at which the firm decided on the applicant it hired. This enables us to exclude all vacancies where the firm decided on the applicant after the intended starting date for the employment relationship. This subsample should therefore no longer include firms, which were unsuccessful in their first recruitment attempt and decided in a second attempt to post their vacancy with the PEA. The fact that our results do not change irrespective of whether we take the whole or the reduced sample indicates that we do not need to worry about reverse causality.
Registered versus unregistered vacancies
We start with a descriptive analysis comparing registered with unregistered vacancies. We denote those vacancies as registered that among other search channels register their vacancy with the PEA, which includes also registrations on the online platform of the PEA. 47.1% of all vacancies in our sample are registered with the PEA. The upper part of Table 1 The differences reported for the endogenous variables can of course be driven by the differences across firm-and job-characteristics. These are reported at the bottom part of 
Share of suitable applicants
The share of suitable applicants among all applicants at registered vacancies is with 41.4% around 3.9 percentage points lower than the share of suitable applicants at unregistered vacancies. This pattern is confirmed by Figure 1 , which shows that the cumulative density distribution for the share of suitable applicants of unregistered vacancies first-order stochastically dominates (is always below) the cumulative density distribution at registered vacancies. In Table 2 we control for observable firm-and job-characteristics by including the logarithm of the establishment size, binary indicator variables for the economic condition of the establishment like "low sales", "financial constraints", and "not enough suitable employees", indicator variables for the qualification and occupation specific experience requirements for the job, indicator variables for parttime and temporary jobs and for jobs requiring weekend-work. In addition we include year-, industryand region-fixed effects. To control for regional time-varying effects we interact the year-and regiondummy variables. Table 2 provides the estimated coefficient for the binary indicator variable, which equals 1 if the vacancy is registered with the PEA as well as the indicator variables for the required qualification level. The remaining regression coefficients for firm-and job-characteristics can be found in Table 5 in the Appendix. Table 2 provides in columns (1) and (2) the OLS estimates for the share of suitable applicants. The dependent variable in columns (3) to (4) is the logarithm of the number of suitable applicants (plus one). To make these results comparable to columns (1) and (2) we include in these regressions the logarithm of the total number of applicants (plus one). (3) and (4)). The coefficients for the qualification requirement in the third and fourth row have the expected sign. They indicate that jobs, which require low skills, have less problems and jobs, which require high skills, have more problems in finding suitable applicants.
In Table 6 in the Appendix we present negative binomial regression coefficient estimates to account for the fact that the number of suitable applicants is a count variable with overdisperson as indicated by the significant α-parameters displayed in Table 6 . Our sample only includes vacancies, which were successful in hiring a worker. Since firms with zero suitable applicants are less likely to have successfully hired a worker, the density of zero suitable applicants is systematically biased towards zero. We therefore run, as a robustness check, a zero-truncated negative binomial regression as well as a negative binomial regression. In both types of regressions the coefficients for the PEA indicator variable are negative, significant at a 1% level and confirm the results based on the OLS estimates in Table 2 .
Since only vacancies, which were successful in hiring a worker, were asked to report the number of total and suitable applicants, we investigate for the whole sample of successful and unsuccessful vacancies whether registered vacancies are more likely to report difficulties in the hiring process, because they had "not enough suitable applicants." Table 3 presents the OLS estimates for the sample of successful vacancies in columns (1), for the sample of successful vacancies that agreed on a candidate before the earliest intended starting date of the employment contract in column (2), for the sample of unsuccessful vacancies in column (3), and for the whole sample in column (4) . We use the same control variables as in Table 2 with the exception of the job characteristics full-time/part-time, temporary/permanent, weekend-work, since the later are not asked for unsuccessful vacancies. The results in Table 3 supports the results of the OLS estimates presented in Table 2 that establishments, which decided to register their vacancy with the PEA, are confronted with a less suitable pool of applicants. The full regression results can be found in the Appendix in Table 7 . The probit estimates, which can be found in Table 8 in the Appendix, are very similar.
The result that the fraction of suitable applicants at vacancies registered with the PEA is about 10 percent lower than at vacancies that only use decentralized search channels is complementary to the empirical evidence on worker self-selection into the PEA based on worker-level data. Using a US household survey Blau and Robins (1990) show that unemployment insurance and welfare recipients are more likely to use the PEA. Using the Canadian Labor Force Survey Osberg (1993) emphasizes the importance to control for sample selection into PEA use. Using the British Labour Force Survey Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) find that PEA use is highest among less skilled and long-term unem- Our analysis is the first to provide evidence from firms' perspective that the same type of worker self-selection can also be found among applicants. This is important, because the worker-based evidence in the literature mentioned above does not necessarily imply our result. For example, it could be that the PEA can detect low type workers and sorts them out. This would imply that registered firms receive more applications from suitable workers. The fact that our results show the opposite, i.e., that registered firms receive more applications from less suitable applicants, implies that the PEA is not able to screen workers efficiently enough to ensure that the applicants they allocate are on average as suitable as the workers that apply through the private market.
Difficulties due to "high wage demands"
Let us finally investigate whether we can also find evidence that the job-brokering mechanism inherent in PEAs leads to lower wage offers for workers that find their jobs through the PEA. The German Job
Vacancy Survey contains information on whether a firm had difficulties in filling the vacancy because of higher wage demands by its applicants. This information is not only able to shed light into the question on whether registered firms offer lower wages than unregistered firms. It also provides information on whether workers receive different wage offers from registered firms compared to unregistered firms, because workers that demand higher wages will only do so, if they can get a higher offer somewhere else.
If our theory is correct, then vacancies registered with the PEA should be more likely to experience such difficulties. The respective variable is available for successful and unsuccessful vacancies. We use the same control variables as in Table 3 . The full set of coefficients can be found in Table 9 in the Appendix and respective probit estimates can be found in Table 10 in the Appendix. The results in Table 4 indicate a strong positive correlation between registering a vacancy with the PEA and experiencing difficulties in the recruitment process due to high wage demands by applicants.
The coefficients of the PEA indicator variable for the sample of successfully filled vacancies are significant at a 1% level (column (1)). This also holds, if we exclude all those observations where firms agreed on an applicant after the intended starting date of the employment contract (column (2)). The coefficient for the unsuccessful vacancies is statistically insignificant (column (3)), but has the same sign and is similar in magnitude. The insignificance might be due to the relatively small sample size of around 2,000 observations in the case of unsuccessful vacancies compared to more than 27,000 observations in the case of successfully filled vacancies. The coefficient for the whole sample is again significant at a 1% level (column (4)).
Our evidence indirectly supports the hypothesis that firms, which register their vacancy with the PEA, offer lower wages than firms, which did not register their vacancy. It also implies residual wage dispersion, which differs systematically depending on whether the vacancy is registered with the PEA or not. This is in line with our theory, which suggests that the job-brokering activity and its competition reducing effect are responsible for lower wages offers at PEAs. Our evidence is therefore in line with the literature that finds that lower wages are paid to workers, who found their job via the PEA, after controlling for worker characteristics like Holzer (1988) for the US and Addison and Protugal (2002) for Portugal.
Conclusion
In order to understand the functioning of labor markets in the presence of the PEA, we develop a simple theory and empirically test its predictions. Our model allows firms to choose between two alternative methods of finding a worker; the search market, where the individual applications are subject to coordination frictions, and the PEA. Searching in the decentralized market is costly for workers, so firms in the decentralized market have to post higher wages than firms registered with the PEA in order to attract workers. Since the value of searching in the private market is higher for high productivity workers, firms in the private market are able to attract a better pool of applicants. Registered firms have no incentive to compete with firms in the decentralized market by offering the same wage, since the job-brokering service of the PEA provides a wage-offer-independent meeting technology for firms.
We use the German Job Vacancy Survey to investigate the predictions of our theory. We find that the fraction of suitable applicants at vacancies registered with the PEA is about 10 percent lower than at vacancies that only use decentralized search channels. We also find support for the hypothesis that firms, which register their vacancy with the PEA, offer lower wages than firms that did not register their vacancy.
An interesting topic for future research would be to assess the effect of labor market reforms, e.g. the so-called Hartz Reform in Germany, since part of the reform package (Hartz III) aimed at restructuring the Public Employment Agency. One issue would be to study whether the crowding out effect studied by Pissarides (1979) has been sustained -more efficient PEAs crowd out private search effort. To evaluate this effect in the context of the Hartz Reform, it would be necessary to extend the model and data to incorporate other parts of the reform -creating new types of employment opportunities (Hartz I), introducing additional wage subsidies (Hartz II), and cutting the unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed (Hartz IV). We believe our framework will best fit to study this and other related issues, like the effect on the wage inequality, of such a reform policy.
Proof of Π a (x) > Π a Using (3) and (4) simplifies the inequality in question to
where the last inequality follows from
Proof of Theorem 1
, where by (1) and (4), x = x(ρ) is determined by
This expression shows that x(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ ∈ [0, 1) and satisfies x(0) ≡ x ∈ (0, ∞) and
In what follows, we use the implicit function Γ to show the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium ρ ∈ [0, 1). There are two possible cases. Suppose in equilibrium a > vρ. This implies ρ ∈ [0,ρ) wherē ρ ≡ min{ 
Observe that:
In the above, we use Γ(x * ) = 0 ⇔ x − e −x and x + 1 − e −x > 1 − e −x − xe −x in the last inequality. Since Γ(0) < 0 < Γ(∞), dΓ dx > 0 at x = x * implies x * ∈ (0, ∞) is unique (that is, Γ(x) curve cannot cross the line Γ(x) = 0 more than once).
Finally, notice that the x * ∈ (0, ∞) satisfying Γ(x * ) = 0 determined above does not depend on v, whereas x (≡ x(0)) determined by (10) 
which implies
To sum up, there exists a unique ρ ∈ (0,ρ) that satisfies 
where x = x(ρ) is determined by (10) as before. Observe that:
where 
which follows from exactly the procedure developed above to show 
Further regression results

